Transcription of Larry Shook interview with Roger Fisher, author of the classic negotiation manual Getting to Yes, *who led the team facilitating* Maclean's *"The People's Verdict" initiative. The interview has been lightly edited for readability.*

[The tape begins with discussion of how to connect with each other in the future, not transcribed here.]

Roger Fisher: My field has been negotiation for some time. A mediator or third party is negotiating with both sides. What I find is useful is get the parties together and first establish open communication between them. And then build some kind of working relationship where they're both tackling the same problem together - they understand they're working on what we can do. No one is negotiating. They may not make a commitment on behalf of anyone else but themselves. They can commit themselves: "I'll recommend this when I get home." "I'll propose that when I get home." But to make the conversation easy, what they say is not a commitment; it may not be quoted outside the room without their permission. Of course, during *Maclean's* with the television there, we had little reality on that. But basically the rules were understood, and what was said there was not a commitment for anybody.

Larry Shook: Could you summarize for me how you felt about the *Maclean's* project as it was published and as it turned out, given all of your experience.

RF: I thought it was successful. I think the people there learned a lot. The publication of it spread some of these ideas a little further. It perhaps directed attention to the fact that solutions are not the answer. People in Canada - and everywhere else - argue about the solutions. And in every case, more important is the *process* by which they work together.

I remember that one of my teaching assistants was madly in love with a fellow law student. They were fighting half the time. She would barge into my office after him sometime and have a quarrel and he'd say, "Excuse me, Roger." And go out in the hall and deal with her. But after some weeks they came in together holding hands and they said, "Roger, we want you to be the first to know that we have *solved* our problem. We're getting married." And I said, "Congratulations. Sit down. You will now have *more* issues to deal with - children, housing, jobs, location, furniture, what color to paint the walls and everything - and the question is not what's the right color to paint the walls or what's the right number of children to have. It's how you deal with that question, how you deal with the differences."

In most conflict situations in the world, there are bound to be conflicting interests *and* conflicting perceptions. It can't be avoided. So the difference between war and peace is how we deal with those conflicting interests and conflicting perceptions. Do *we* understand how *they* see it?

When I worked on Ecuador and Peru during the last few years on their boundary problem, we had twelve people at Harvard, six Ecuadorians and six Peruvians, sitting every other one in a semicircle facing some flip charts. The first assignment: I said,

"OK. I want you to know the person next to you well enough to introduce him or her to the group. I'll give you 30 minutes to talk with each other, so you can present that person to the group." In the role of introducer, you don't introduce them as a jerk! You say good things about them. That's kind of implicit. So they're carrying on a conversation and I said, "OK, OK, let's get started." The Peruvian admiral said, "Oh. I totally forgot to ask! I know nothing about my new friend except matters that are too personal to discuss! Give me a few more minutes to find out where he went to university…" It turned out by pure chance that the first thing he said was "I almost couldn't get here because of my mentally retarded daughter. I was taking care of her." And the rector of Guayaquil University said, "*You* have a mentally retarded daughter? So do I!" And for the next thirty minutes they both talked about the problem and how to deal with it.

When they finished that and introduced each other, then I said "All right. Now pair up with somebody else and I want you to now have another half hour or an hour in which you clarify points you think the other side misunderstands about your side. And when the other person is talking and you're asking questions, you only ask *honest* questions, not 'Why are you such an idiot?', but honest questions. And you take notes of everything that surprises you. Then it's your turn to explain what your side's belief they've misunderstood back to the other side. So the people in the group are learning, they're taking notes - "I never knew they thought that! I didn't understand the way they worried about this!" - and so forth.

(It was a little different in Canada: I forgot exactly how we ran the whole thing, I talked to them a little bit about negotiation theory.)

As we went through time together, we divided up by rooms sometimes and said, "Alright: write down the interests of the other side." *They're* writing down *your* interests. And a group will agree on a one-page statement of the primary interests of the other side. Photocopy that. Give one to each member of the group. They go over and find a third partner, a new partner, and they edit that statement of that side's interests to the satisfaction of that individual. We don't argue; we just edit it down: "What did we get wrong about this?" Then the Peruvians all come back together again with six different edited versions. And now they're all arguing about *Ecuador's* interests. "Well, she told me this!" "No, no: I think you got it wrong. They really care more about *this*!" So they then produce a consolidated statement of interests on a flip chart. Each room was doing it for the other side. And then they come to the plenary room again. They put the flip charts on the wall. And they can edit and make further changes as long as a majority of that group believes it ought to be made. [That is, Side A can edit Side B's description of Side A's interests.] So if they're editing what the Peruvian's did to their interests, they can change it. But that way each side really understands what the other side cares about.

Then you start saying, "OK. What are some things that might be done in the near future?" Subjects to deal with: There's border problems. There's language problems. There's religion problems. There are security issues, trade, whatever there is. And then they invent "Who could do what about those issues?" They put 'em on Post-It slips over the wall - and if they find somebody from the other group who wants to work with them on

that idea, they turn that idea into what I call "a yes-able proposition" - an operational decision that could be made by somebody: "We're gonna propose a free trade zone on the border." "We're gonna do this or that about information - we're gonna exchange newspaper columns back and forth to see if they have an understanding of what's going on."

All of this is non-committal, going from interests to options to specific detailed options. And by that time, they've got a pretty good understanding.

LS: Right. The process seems so wonderful and it seems to have so much potential. And that *Maclean's* editorial package did such an exceptional job of clarifying it. I'm wondering if going in to that project - I mean, here's a major national publication, circulation of two million - I'm wondering if going in to that project you had any thoughts or hopes about what might result from it, from publishing so broadly how this process works…

RF: I was concerned that the media, as is frequently the case, would be looking for conflict, looking for controversy, and reporting that. Television in particular would try and clarify the difference between the Quebec people who want to be a sovereign Quebec and other Canadians who did not. It came out better than I feared.

I normally would not let the media get near such a meeting because particularly people who have a political future tend to talk to the media all the time. We had enough going on in that room so that they were interested enough in what was taking place *there*, and the television cameras were kind of in the back of the room nonintrusively and people forgot them fairly quickly.

When we went out to work outdoors - on a table outdoors, sunshine, a beautiful day - and they brought their cameras out over their shoulder. I remember asking one Quebecer what he thought, and the over-the-shoulder camera came right up and stuck in his face and he said, "Roger, I was going to tell you something else, but when I talk to my constituents, this is what I say…" and he went bang, bang, bang, right into the camera. He was such a political figure that he had to be thinking of his constituents all the time. We're not backing down; we're understanding the enemy, we're getting their points of view so we'll be able to fight them better… you know, it's just terrible!

So normally I keep the media as far away as I can. I do let people write about *their* experience and what *they* learned without quoting anybody by name. They can say, "I came to this impression. What I learned here was this. There's more worry about that than about this." But the media is such a powerful impact. I was thinking of the television. Now, *Maclean's* came out and editor Kevin Doyle very much cared about it. (He knew my work: that's how I got hold of it.) He kept sufficient control over that to make the reporting, I thought, very fair.

LS: All of the reporters at *Maclean's* that I've talked to about it eight years later still remember it as an exceptional experience - moving and persuasive…

RF: I think of the critical dimensions of negotiation or conflict - one is **communication**, and that means listening as well as talking, saying what's on your mind and not for the record, explaining things. Another is **relationship** - how you *treat* the other side, as an adversary or do you sit side by side when you're working at a table. You treat them as colleagues with whom you're working. Then *on* the table is not the positions of the party but their **interests**: What are their primary concerns on both sides, understanding what their concerns are, what they feel about it. When they say "sovereignty", you want to know, well really, what's sovereignty got to do with it? "What are you worried about? Is the language thing beat down? Lack of self-government? What are your underlying wants and needs?" Then you get **options**: What are some possible ways of meeting those interests? What are some things we might do to meet those interests? Then you have **criteria** or standards by which to judge those options, so they're fair to both sides. These may be precedent, other examples of it working, equal choice by each side, one's not dominating the other, and so forth. Then you've got the **substance of the negotiation understood**, your understanding of the problem. You then have a **choice**: Either make some **commitments**, actual promises that are going to be made OR you go to your **Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement** - your BATNA. In each case you want to understand each side: What will we commit to if we commit, and what happens if we don't reach agreement?

So those seven elements are the essence of what one is dealing with in a conflict and usually through diagnosis, you can see [which element is problematic]. If I come in as a doctor, I can see either its poor communication, or people are focusing on their position - unity for Canada, sovereignty for Quebec - rather than what they really care about, rather than their concerns, their wants, their needs. They then have two options: I win or you win. It's a win/lose. You tend to force it and the media helps to do that, too: force it into an either/or position. Or they can't decide what a fair standard is. In Kosovo[1] we couldn't decide whether it was sovereignty or human rights. There's human rights standards and also you don't go bombing sovereign countries. These are different criteria they're using by which to judge the conduct. And then you gotta figure out what happens if we don't reach agreement. I've been working the last month on Kosovo and the alternatives are not very good, where we have the kind of commitments you want people to make. Those are the kinda things they're only worrying about now: How do you stage the military coming in with the military going out? How do you get refugees to come in without getting the KLA[2] coming in? How do you get the buildings that are houses prepared in time for the refugees who want to return? So if you try to draft an agreement that the other side could sign, we realized we had no idea what the actual agreements would look like. We're going to win a war or lose a war. So the more one works on what are some possible commitments, some interim commitments - "We will stop bombing for 48 hours if during that period you move some equipment out" or "We'll suspend the bombing for another 5 days" - but you have to turn these problems into possible answers. And it helps to have people who are not - whatever their authority is in normal life - here they're not

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[1] The 1998-1999 war in Kosovo, Yugoslavia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War

[2] The Kosovo Liberation Army, the Kosovo Albanian rebel group, founded in 1991.

the president of the country and here they have no authority to commit anybody except themselves to what they'll recommend. And that means the learning, the relationship, and the understanding are all without big political consequences, so they you can work on it. I got some materials on this stuff if the organization you're working for would like some, on facilitated joint brainstorming.

LS: Very much. (He provides his address off-tape.)

RF: What I'm trying to devote myself is to spread the skills of dealing with differences. And we've got a nonprofit firm across the street from the law school which is the one that actually went to Spokane [or rather, Canada].[3] Harvard University *as* Harvard University doesn't go off and do things like that. So when I'm off with Ecuador and Peru dealing with their boundary dispute, I'm doing it with the Conflict Management Group - although I bring the stuff back and teach the students how to do it.

LS: There are a couple of nitty-gritty questions that occur to me after reading the *Maclean's* project. I just want to ask these to you in real broad terms. Does your process of negotiation which you modeled there with *Maclean's* illuminate any new possibilities for governance and for humanity as a whole? - and how would you describe those?

RF: The important point that I have is that people separate their interests from their position. If they've take a position for sovereignty or taken a position for autonomy, what are their real concerns, in practical terms? I was working with [Georgian] president [Eduard] Shevarnadze and the breakaway unrecognized government of South Ossetia whose people want to be a sovereign state. I was talking to one of them when I was there. I said, "Really sovereign, like a country?" "Oh, yes!" "UN membership?" "Yeah, of course!" I said, "Well, what's your budget?" It's about, you know, a few thousand people. "What's your budget for a UN office?" "Doesn't the UN pay for that?" I said, "No, the UN does not pay for that." And I said, "Who's going to regulate aircraft safety and the licensing of dentists and doctors?"

Many people who want sovereignty haven't thought of who among the people they know in their area have the competence to license drugs or to do other things. They haven't thought about it. So you have to find out what they really care about. Do they care about not having the Georgians barge in and kill them? Do they care about respect for their language? Things of that kind.

So it's separating interests from positions. It separates the inventing of things from committing - brainstorming from committing. It is very hard for presidents to sit down and brainstorm without one of his great ideas being asserted before they've even thought about it at all. So you have to have a carefully considered brainstorming of a wide range of ideas. That takes place at a separate time and place from making binding

[3] Fisher misspoke here. He meant Canada. Larry Shook had just told Fisher his address, which was in Spokane, WA, so Spokane was on Fisher's mind at the moment.

commitments and encourages inventing the best solutions. So those critical things are really important. Do you have a little book of mine called *Getting to Yes*?

LS: Yes.

RF: That's got a lot of it in it, although in the last 20 years I've learned some things. When I talked with the president of Ecuador in 1995 about the situation there, there were only two options on the table: either win or lose. I said, "Is the current process going to generate more options?" He said, "No. I refuse to talk to [Peruvian president] Fujimori." I said, "How about some facilitated joint brainstorming?" I ran through that operation speaking with the National Security Council down there [in Ecuador] and went up afterwards and thanked him for the chance to talk and asked "What about Ecuadorians brainstorming?" And he said, "Do it. Who do you want from Ecuador?" I said, "I've gotten to know your chief of staff Carlos fairly well. I thought I'd ask his advice." He said, "Take Carlos. He's terrific." I said, "But he's your chief of staff." He said, "If I understood you correctly, no commitments can be made? Fine, take Carlos. Who else do you want?" "I want a military man." "Well, General [Telmo] Sandoval knows you. Take him. He won't wear his uniform there." So we took these fairly significant people and engaged in this activity and they became more important. They got more deeply involved.

It is very important to separate thinking about possibilities from making concessions and negotiating. It helps, I've found, to have a third party like me running the meeting, because unless they are well experienced in this, they tend to fall back into arguing about what happened or about what's right and what's wrong or whose fault it is, rather than on creatively thinking up some things that might be done.

We've got a couple of hundred people in Cyprus now who went through the training and they can work together by themselves, Greeks and Turks, on arranging some stuff, little things at the lower level where they operate.

LS: The process that *Maclean's* used - having this highly competent sampling firm do these two things: (1) come up with a dependable profile of the nation's psyche, identifying the dominant strains of thought and then (2) getting a statistically valid sampling of that psyche - and then arranging to sit down with those representatives under the guidance of expert facilitation, like you… Why wouldn't every democracy in the world do that kind of thing routinely? In other words, why didn't Canada do that as a result of seeing that exercise? Why aren't we doing it in the US? The Harvard Negotiation Project is well known, well respected. *You* certainly are. It seems as though you've identified a *very* exciting process to take democracy to the next frontier. Why aren't we doing that?

RF: I've not thought about it quite that way. So let me try… I think that the sampling of questions which was done before the *Maclean's* episodes tended to be asking people about their positions. Although they got a fair sample of these human beings, as human beings will, they were more reasonable than the pollsters thought. There's a group here in

Cambridge that have been working on some difficult conversations like abortion.[4] They get people from both sides meeting every couple of weeks for a while and find out if they can move forward and understand each other - not reach a compromise but maybe both work on reducing unwanted pregnancies. The people identify themselves ….

[The tape ends suddenly at this point, mid-tape, as if the "record" button was accidentally turned off. The interview resumes at the same point on the other side - after an unknown amount of time - as follows:]

… was a place called Tuwensa [unsure of spelling], a little settlement of a half a dozen houses in the middle of the jungle which Ecuador conquered and Peru lost a couple of its soldiers and had to retreat in defeat.

LS: What year was that?

RF: January '95. And the result is that the public opinion in Ecuador - when asked a year ago, in June '98, if in the negotiations with Peru, Ecuador could get everything it wanted in terms of access to the Amazon and a trade border station there, etc., etc. - but had to give up this little settlement of Tuwensa, should it accept the treaty? 90% of the public opinion said "No!" And in Peru it was about 75% that said "No! We must never give up Tuwensa!" It's like the Alamo, you know, the great big battle where you have to keep it. If you sampled public opinion on should we give up Tuwensa or not, you end up with a nightmare. Knowing the concerns - the president had public opinion opposed to giving it up, but there's really nothing there. The houses got destroyed in the war. There is nothing there in the jungle at all except the place name. Well, the solution we worked out, with help, was to say, "OK. Since it looks like the better boundary line we are disputing over, Peru has the better legal claim to Tuwensa, Tuwensa will be *in* Peru - right on the edge, but *in* Peru. And then we drew a square kilometer around Tuwensa - and that one square kilometer of land is *owned* by Ecuador in perpetuity, like you'd own an embassy building or something. So the president Mahuad of Ecuador says, "We didn't give up Tuwensa. We own it forever." And president Fujimori said, "We didn't give up Tuwensa. It is part of our sovereign territory." If you get people who have been arguing over positions for a long time, the pollsters will not ask the public if they would accept such an idea.

LS: Could the polling process be refined to reflect that understanding?

RF: Gee… The polling is almost always on positions. It may be you could have concerns with individuals - "What are you worried about what we are doing?" But the pollsters say, "Who are you going to vote for for president - Bush vs Dole?" They don't say, "Are you worried about Bush's lack of experience? Do you realize that the governor of Texas, out of all the states in the Union, has the least powers of a governor?" The commissioners run Texas. The governor greets people, and does very little. Do you want a man with that little experience being chief executive? Well, you're right in the middle

[4] The Public Conversations Project http://www.publicconversations.org/

of arguing the case. I don't know. I find that if I take able, sensible people - not the extreme partisans at either edge and not people who are not great doves who will settle anything - but people who have points of view that are smart and will listen: Give me a week with them or give me several days with them and they're sitting side by side at a table trying to work on something together. So I think that having able people who are very familiar with the concerns of their community - and however they're picked - *Maclean's* did a good job of picking these people and the fact that we had some politicians there didn't hurt - but I'm not sure on more and more issues how dominant I want the polling to be. That was one of my concerns. It turned out not to be bothersome there. But I think that you can take however you select them… having the legitimacy of polls helped *Maclean's*. *Maclean's* was going to have a tough problem if they couldn't explain why *these* people were chosen, therefore they hired independent people to choose them.

When we picked Ecuadorians and Peruvians, we didn't have to justify that. And when in Georgia and South Ossetia we picked some Georgians and some South Ossetians, we didn't have to defend that to anybody. The president said he understood that we had to pick their worst enemies on it. South Ossetia is on the south side of the Caucusus. North Ossetia is on the north side of the Caucusus. When Georgia was fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, which it succeeded in getting, South Ossetia was fighting for independence *from* Georgia and it joined up with North Ossetia. But the Russians kept control over North Ossetia. For a time the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe - the OSCE - maintained a cease-fire line around South Ossetia to protect them from the Georgian rampant military who engaged in their own version of ethnic cleansing at that time.

LS: In a society like ours the ethic has operated in the past that what is good for General Motors is good for America. I don't know the extent to which that ethic is operating now - but it does clarify some of the classic interests that have defined our deliberation - in other words, the interests of government, the interests of economic players, and then the interests of citizens who have their own needs and concerns. Is that a fair characterization of the critical parties involved? And secondly, if it is - or however you would add to it - what kind of enlightenment is needed on the part of all those parties to make your process more accessible to the world?

RF: That's a good question. I find that if I can get people away from their constituents for a while - where there's General Motors management and union leaders away from their constituents - that we can discuss what to do about the upcoming labor situation between General Motors and the union. Even between these polarized camps, you can do very well. At one point I had the vice president of General Motors for labor relations and the president of the UAW for General Motors (they have different presidents for Chrysler and so forth) both sitting here in my office. I said, "Oh, gee, this is great." We'd worked for a while together. I said, "This is great. I gotta get a photograph of this." And both of them said, "Not on your life! Our jobs are at stake if people found that we were colluding together."

LS: Wow.

RF: When we do the Greek and Turkish Cypriots together - we met in West Virginia for one time - we had to spend a *full day* of a week about their concerns about going home, having met with the enemy, and how they could justify it, and what they're going to say. The press knew the meeting was taking place; they'd found out about it. So the problem of re-immersion back in their community from this safe sanctuary where they could say what they thought and give up some ideas, was a real problem. I've tried to spread these techniques by example in South Africa, El Salvador, Ecuador/Peru, South Ossetia and Georgia, and internally we're doing some with gangs here in Boston, teaching people in middle school - 7th and 8th grade - some of these skills. I think that the pattern that a tough negotiator is someone who takes a firm position: As [U.S. Secretary of State] Madeline Albright said, "We're not negotiating. We're bombing." As if negotiating is a sign of weakness. I consider negotiation a sign of confidence! If we talk, we can work something out that will satisfy my interests. But the zero-sum aspect of negotiating that I'm offering you $15 for that rocking chair and that's all it is. Well, the price is $25, I'm sorry. That model of how you negotiate is so widespread, that it takes a lot of work to educate people that it's really joint problem-solving and you'll solve the problem better if you work on it together. I think it's the model of fear that their constituents will think they gave in - "We will not be seen talking to Milošević!"[5] - Well, God, he's the guy in charge in there. How the hell do you settle this problem without listening and talking to him?

LS: So this zero-sum habit of mind that exists in the world is, in itself, one of the primary obstacles you find yourself having to deal with. And one of the best ways you've found of dealing with it is just by setting the example of what the alternative is and what the experience of the alternative is. Is that accurate?

RF: Yeah. You've got a number of people - significant people - who either talk to their bosses or talk below them and write something - who understand it. I did a workshop for the all-white cabinet of [South African president Frederik Willem] de Klerk and then I did a workshop with the African National Congress (ANC).[6] And when they started negotiating, the chief negotiator for the government was Roelf Meyer, Minister of Defense. The chief negotiator for the African National Congress was Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General of the ANC. There were other minor parties, but the two of them were the major parties. When they first met at the place where they were going meet together in a room to work and talk about things. I went back a couple of years later to interview

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[5] Slobodan Milošević was a Serbian and Yugoslav politician who was the President of Serbia (originally the Socialist Republic of Serbia) from 1989 to 1997 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000. He was tried for war crimes related to the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo.

[6] de Klerk was the last president of apartheid-era South Africa and leader of the pro-apartheid National Party. The African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela, was South Africa's primary anti-apartheid force with both militant revolutionary and political activities.

them and Roelf said, "I came into this room and Cyril was already there, and I said 'I hope you'll call me Roelf. May I call you Cyril? We've got a lot of work to do. There was a table there with one chair on each side of it. I picked up the chair that Cyril was not in and I moved it around and put it next to him on the same side of the table. I dumped my papers down and I said '*We've* got a lot of work to do, sitting side by side on that side of the table. Do you know what happened?" I said, "No, what happened?" He said, "Cyril burst out laughing." I said, "Laughing at you?" He said, "Laughing *with* me. He said, 'Boy, you took the same seminar I did!'" And the two of them - although they never have been over to dinner together at each other's hous, one's black, one's white - they became very close professional colleagues, working colleagues. People saw them on television working. Cyril told me when I was last over there, "This has become a country of negotiators."

LS: Now let me ask you something about this anecdote. What is it about that anecdote that is so touching? As you went through that just now, I got tears in my eyes. When you did the exercise at *Maclean's* people who felt great antagonism toward one another at the beginning wound up tearfully hugging one another. What is that about?

RF: My next book is going to be called *Negotiating with Emotions*. It's really being aware of your own feelings and aware of the feelings of the other side and how do you enlist them in the exercise and working together. I was moved at the time. People who have seen themselves as adversaries and something comes - *the humanity of them*: they realize there's more to this person than that, this is a human being in the same situation I'm in, in some ways. It's terribly important.

A couple of weeks ago I was talking to a bunch of Latin American dignitaries taking a 3-day course up here on negotiation. I asked them to prepare some questions I could answer on the last day, on Friday. One of the questions was, "Professor Fisher, you're so damn rational. Where's the room for instinct and intuition? Where's your room for intuition in this?" That was a very good question, and I told them so and we went downstairs talking and I said, "Well, there's inventing and there's deciding. Inventing - if an idea comes from your mind, that's great. But check it out with your gut before you try it out. Does it feel right? If your intuition says "Do something!", think about it before you try it. Use each one as a governor on the other, but don't kill it off newborn before it happens. Don't stifle it. Don't prevent a good idea from being developed. I think you have to design a system where both good brains and human feeling can take over - and it can be felt and dealt with.

It is very satisfying to be able to do this - to see the people looking at each other in Canada, to see the Ossetians in Georgia, to see - God! - *the South Africans* working with each other that way. But it takes time to break out of their set assumptions which are *we're enemies… the positions are what count… you're supposed to look tough… you must not give in* - all those assumptions of the standard *game* of carrying on a conflict. I find sitting on the same side of a table has an enormous impact.

I got the president of Ecuador when he went down to meet Fujimori for the first time. I said, "I want a photograph when you come back." He said, "Oh, there'll be plenty of photographs taken of us shaking hands." And I said, "No. I want a photograph of the two of you sitting down and both of you looking at the same pad of paper with a pencil out there and you're both talking about that piece of paper." And he came back with a front-page photograph of that from Bolivia. He says, "OK. Roger is that ok?" I said, "That's exactly right. So there will be thousands of people who have their vision of adversaries changed when they see the two of you working together with a pad of paper in front of you. That'll change their perception of what's going on."

At the signing of the Ecuador-Peru agreement in Brazilia, Fujimori was the first to speak. He said, "There are many people to be congratulated and thanked for the help they've given us settling this 57 year old boundary dispute. But the one I want to thank the most is the woman who raised her son to be the president of Ecuador. And he left the lectern and went down to the second row where the president's mother was sitting down and gave her a very Latin, un-Japanese kiss - and 800 people went wild.

LS: Wow…

RF: They couldn't believe it! But that notion that I want to thank the woman who raised her son to be the president of Ecuador - that *kind* of bringing *humanity* into it - is terribly important.

LS: Well, that's a good note to end on. That gives me what I was looking for.

RF: What's the name of this organization?

[Off-tape Larry Shook identifies the Co-Intelligence Institute and they talk about that for an unknown period of time. Then:]

RF: I have a hard time getting funding for our nonprofit, because of the world the way it is. Typically, we could use a rapid response fund: there's an opportunity to do something and a foundation takes months to consider something. So there's stuff we can't do because we haven't got the rapid response funding available - and they [the Co-Intelligence Institute] may be interested in learning more about this. Is their focus on conflict resolution?

LS: Yes - and beyond that. I'd say conflict resolution is inevitably a component, but as the name of the organization implies, their real thrust is - as the executive director Tom Atlee puts it - instead of experiencing co-stupidity - which is what humanity mostly experiences - actually experiencing the synergism of ideas, experience, etc., that tangibly results in co-intelligence. That's what they're exploring.

RF: Our current slogan is "Solutions are not the answer. It's process." If people argue over the past or when they quarrel about the future, they're quarrelling as to which is the right answer. There are no answers that will end all conflicting interests and perceptions.

The answer is how we *deal* with others when we have differences. You listen, you talk, you converse, you use help from third parties, and you can deal with your problem in a way that does not humiliate either side - and let's go forward. So the framing of the world's problems as "who has the right answer?" - no, it's "what is the *solution* going to be?" How is the *future* of Kosovo's solution going to be? And it's really how we work together to *figure out* the next stage in its history, how we work together to deal with those concerns, how you put something in place. The one thing that the militant generals left out in going into Kosovo was the internal dispute resolution: If anybody has a problem with the Russians, here's the committee, here's their phone number on a cell phone. You call up and say, "We've got a problem there." And the committee of four or five people comes over and they discuss it and see if they can work something out. But you have to have a process for dealing with all of them pulling guns on each other. But you've got better friends in the military than I have.

LS: Well, those come from some pretty good sources.

RF: The fact that the frame of reference of the public and the leadership - the leadership being influenced by the public - still has "Who's the enemy?" "Who's more powerful?" "How do we make them do what we want to do?" and "Who are good guys?" *We are!* "Who are bad guys?" *Milošević is a bad guy!* And I think the co-intelligence - the common sense - "common" in the sense of applying to both sides - is what we're looking for. And this needs articulation. It needs to be spelled out in understandable terms. I think one reason the little book *Getting to Yes* is so popular is that it puts some of these ideas in very simple terms, very simple language. God, it continues to sell. It sells over 100,000 copies every year.

LS: My goodness!

RF: It came out in '81, but it's sort of organized common sense. I would try to get the Co-Intelligence Institute to articulate the assumptions that are being made that are wrong, which underlie why we go to war in Kosovo and why we think that some anti-missile missiles are the salvation of the United States. And look at those assumptions and look at some better assumptions. Then the question is, how do you spread the better ones around. How do you make people realize them. That's a good challenge they have.

You really ought to come to Harvard. You're not free next week? I'm giving a 5-day open course…

LS: What an offer. My gosh.

RF: This is for lawyers and others, five-day basic course on negotiation. All day every day for five days.

LS: Wow. Well that's a very generous offer. My deadline will preclude me taking you up on it, but maybe there will be an opportunity to do it another time.

RF: I do one in the fall around the election - the first of November in the fall - when it's a fly-out week for law students so the building is empty and I can round up another hundred people and break them into sections and do it.

LS: I'd love to do that.

RF: I'm glad to have someone who thinks there's intelligence in these ideas that needs to be spread around. I'll shoot some stuff to you and you'll fax me back if you have something. You can print it without clearing it with me, but I'll try to check it and sharpen it up and clarify some, if I've been speaking too loosely and not precisely enough.

LS: Thank you very much. I'll certainly take advantage of that offer.

RF: OK. It was good to talk.

LS: OK. Thanks a lot. Thank you, sir.